to the most suitable coal for its purposes at distances varying from almost 4,000 to 10,000 miles from its point of origin. This paper explores various aspects of the development of this trade and argues that, in discussions of the development of the informal empire, the significance of (Welsh) coal should not be overlooked, as has tended to be the case in some modern works.
Many different ideas have been developed by historians to try to reflect the nature of the relationship existing in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries between Britain and Latin American countries. Foremost amongst these is that of 'informal empire,' an idea initially developed in John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson's seminal publication,
The Imperialism of Free Trade, and which suggested that Latin America countries, while not under British rule and therefore not part of the formal British Empire, provided a prime example of imperial dominion through British economic power.
This idea was expanded upon by Cain and Hopkins who famously advocated the importance of free trade and the informal empire to Britain in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, predicated on the fact that business interests were often closely intertwined with political ones. 1 Cain and Hopkins' concept of 'gentlemanly capitalism' drew specific attention to the role of finance and services such as shipping and insurance. 2 Subsequent work on South American states has reinforced the view that British influence was fundamental to their development in the nineteenth century. 3 Nevertheless, the relevance of the term informal empire to describe this relationship has often been challenged since, not least with respect to key countries in South America. Winn, for example, notes that Britain's desire for a level playing field with respect to free trade represented a "self-serving piety," since she knew that Britain would be the only real beneficiary, while Simpson recognises the importance of free trade in creating "a framework in which self help and private initiative could flourish." 4 Despite their agreement over the importance of free trade, while Winn considers that the experience of Uruguay fits the Gallagher-Robinson informal empire model, Simpson argues that, in Argentina, there is no evidence of "any systematic policy of informal rule" exercised by the British government. 5 While free trade can result in mutual benefits, as Lewis has pointed out, the gains need not be shared equally between the participants. 6 Nevertheless, he notes that the benefits of British investment in Argentinian railways in the late nineteenth century accrued to both the London-based railway companies and the local political elites. Pointing out that this investment does not fit the hegemonic/satellite, Gallagher-Robinson or dependency models, Lewis argues that, broadly speaking, the foreign railway companies "delivered what was expected of them in terms of statebuilding, frontier-expansion, market-integration and nation-building, and the valorisation of local assets." 7 As in other countries, the Argentinian railways played an important role in shaping the nature and the extent of internal economic development through reducing internal transport costs. Using data on Argentina,
Fajgelbaum and Redding have identified the significance of complementary internal
investments in mediating the response of an economy to external integration into world markets in the late nineteenth century. 8 Pascali, however, has pointed out that the reductions in trade barriers resulting from moves towards free trade do not automatically generate large positive effects on economic development. 9 While noting that the development of the steam engine for marine propulsion accounts for about half of the growth in world trade in the second half of the nineteenth century, Pascali points to the important influence of institutions on urbanization rates and population density: trade had greater positive effects in those countries with inclusive institutions, in contrast to those with autocratic regimes. 10 In recent years, the historical process of globalisation has attracted the attention of economic geographers, who have stressed the significance of trade networks for economic development. 11 Recent research into informal empire has likewise looked towards networks, questioning "how the existence and unity of empires were made possible by supranational connections, and how empires fostered networks that cut across national boundaries." 12 By combining the historical and geographical approaches, this paper examines one specific network which was fundamental to the relationship between Britain and South America between the middle of the nineteenth century and the First World War: the export of Welsh coal.
Economic relations between Britain and South America, 1850-1913
Analysing developments between the mid-nineteenth century and the 1920s, BulmerThomas concluded that there was a "'natural' complementarity between the world's greatest imperial power [Britain] and a region [Latin America] blessed with a capacity to produce cheap raw materials and foodstuffs." 13 A combination of factors, including
Britain's adoption of free trade, the growing commitment of Latin American countries to export-led growth, the willingness of capital to once again flow into Latin America, and, to a much lesser extent, the migration of British labour, all played a role in this process. While "British pre-eminence in foreign investment in Latin America was not Key to such developments were two technological innovations of the period, namely the transatlantic steamship and the railway, both of which made importing and exporting to and from the region less burdensome. 19 The penetration by railways of the interior of countries such as Brazil and Argentina, especially the latter, enabled the development of modern, steam-powered domestic textile and milling industries, by bringing the supplies of coal needed to power the new factories and mills. 20 As well as providing the means by which steam power could be distributed more widely, railways themselves required coal for their daily operations. Coal, therefore, was fundamental to economic growth in South America between 1850 and 1913, despite the emergence in some countries towards the end of the study period of hydro-electric power schemes and the exploitation of local oil resources.
Coal and economic development in South America, 1850-1913
Nineteenth century economic development was predicated on power, and while wind or water could be harnessed for some purposes, it was steam power that proved the most significant. While peat and wood could be used as fuels in certain circumstances, The nature of British coal exports to South America will now be examined, followed by a consideration of the role of the network of ports and coaling stations which made this trade and its protection by the Royal Navy possible.
British coal exports, 1850-1913
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With domestic supplies of coal falling well short of what was required to fuel economic development and the growth of urban centres, most South American economies, with the possible exception of Chile, were reliant on imported coal to meet their power needs. 30 Coal was needed to fuel the locomotives on the expanding railway network, to provide steam power to industry and to the steamships engaged in coastal and overseas trade. As with supplies for domestic use, the coal required for bunkering ships also had to be imported, but where did it come from?
In his statistical study of the "growth, character, and direction of our foreign trade in coal during the second half of the nineteenth century," the Welsh coalowner from Cardiff see the Appendix). Shorter distances meant faster sailing times, but they did not necessarily imply a cheaper freight rate, shipping records revealing no simple link between the two. 38 Prior to the commencement of wheat exports around 1890, coal exports to South America "had to pay a significant portion of the round trip cost" but, thereafter, "wheat exports assumed much of the joint cost," as did subsequently exports of cattle and meat. 39 Falling freight rates in the latter decades of the study period fuelled the expansion of coal exports. From relatively small beginnings in the 1850s, 40 annual
British coal exports to South America finally exceeded a million tons in the early 1880s, having all but reached this total in 1874 (see Figure But for what purposes was the imported coal used? In Brazil, one diplomatic and consular report indicates that, in the early 1900s, 75 percent of the coal imported at Rio de Janeiro was used for steam purposes (railways, steamships, etc.), 15 percent was gas coal and 10 percent was used for domestic (household) purposes.
Furthermore, "Of the steam coal imported it is estimated that 10 percent is reshipped for bunkers of British vessels." 43 Within Brazil, the largest customer, the Central Railway, was supplied with 120,000 tons in 1900 by a British firm which undertook to supply Admiralty List coals. 44 In Argentina, "The Buenos Ayres and Rosario, Buenos Ayres Great Southern, and the Central Argentina Railway contracts regularly went to suppliers of South Wales steam coal." 45 The rapid development of the Chile, for example, were unsuitable for steamships, lacking adequate bunkering facilities, with only poor quality local coals available and "turn-around times [which were] far too slow to make steamships economic." 52 The provision of suitable bunkering facilities was gradually achieved through a mix of harbour improvements and the establishment of specialised coaling stations, the size of this network increasing with the growth in the number of steamships.
The growth of harbour facilities
While smaller steamships may have been able to refuel at lesser ports and small natural harbours, the vast majority of large ones, especially those belonging to major shipping lines, would have collected their coal supplies when calling at the major ports due to their superior infrastructure. The amount of coal needed by such ships would depend on their size, the distance to be travelled and the precise routes taken (in particular, where the next possible coaling point might be). The choice of where to refuel could, however, be influenced greatly by the facilities available and the cost of taking on coal at individual ports. 53 The decision of ship's captains on where to refuel depended heavily on the port charges and whether or not the coal imported for bunkering purposes had to incur any duty.
In 1911, Welsh coal was taken to 21 destinations in South America. 54 The amounts ranged from 1.83 million tons unloaded at Buenos Aires through 0.75 million tons at Montevideo and 0.74 million tons at Rio de Janeiro, to 0.33 million tons at Bahia Blanca, 0.25 million tons at Rosario, and 0.18 million tons at Santos.
Minor destinations, such as South Georgia and the Falklands, failed to take any coal in 1911, though they usually took small amounts each year. Since we do not have the space to examine developments at all locations, we will confine ourselves to a brief overview of developments at the two most important and sometimes rival locations, the Rio de la Plata and Rio de Janeiro, focusing on the competitive nature of the bunker fuel trade.
The coal trade of the Rio de la Plata
In the mid-1880s, Montevideo could be referred to as the "first harbour on the southern half of the South American east coast," but at a time when sailing ships still dominated trade with South America its harbour was only usable for two-thirds of the year, due to the southerly winds which affected it between May and August. In the early twentieth century it was noted that steamers calling only to take on coal at La Plata would no longer have to pay entrance and dock dues according to their tonnage but only according to the quantity of coal taken (minimum of 100 tons 
Rio de Janeiro
In the early 1890s it was recorded that "homeward bound steamers of the Shaw Savill and New Zealand Shipping Companies call at Rio once a month each to coal" as well as bringing various supplies. 66 Nevertheless, refuelling at Rio was negatively affected by the lack of facilities and the high duty (c.2 shillings per ton) imposed on coal imports at this time, causing ships to refuel at Montevideo, where it was duty free.
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Although over time the facilities improved, problems of heavy charges still remained.
Thus a decade later it was noted that, although coal had by this time become nominally free of duty, "the charges levied on it in Brazilian ports are in fact very heavy," amounting to approximately 4 shillings per metric ton. 68 Local regulations were also viewed unfavourably:
Foreign steamers calling at Rio de Janeiro merely in order to take in coal or provisions must comply with all the ordinary formalities of entry and clearance before they can sail. The working hours of the custom-house are from 10 A.M. to 3 P.M., and a steamer putting in for bunkers runs the risk of being detained until the following day, and on Saturdays or on the eve of a holiday the detention may be even more serious. 69 Heavy port charges at Rio also had a negative effect, although by 1908 "a law is now enforced under which steamers entering solely for supplies and not working cargo are freed from all further expenses on payment of 2l. 87 On the eve of the First World War, the company, which produced just under 1.9 million tons of coal, making it the sixth largest producer in the south Wales coalfield, has been described by Yeo as "the largest coal-owning and exporting concern in South Wales." 
The Royal Navy and coal supplies in South America
British trade routes, whether with the formal or informal empire, needed protecting, though not all to the same extent. Whereas the formal empire was the focus of heavy protection, and the Mediterranean and China stations were considered, outside of home waters, to be the areas in need of most naval presence, the trade routes to South America were not left unprotected. However, since the South Atlantic, like the Pacific, was not the most important area for the navy to protect, hybrid steam and sail ships continued to provide some of the Royal Navy's presence there even into the early twentieth century. While it was the adoption of the triple expansion engine in the 1880s, which finally enabled steam to fulfil its worldwide role, this progress was something of a two-edged sword. 89 On the one hand it provided the Royal Navy with an enhanced source of naval power, but on the other it made it easier for Britain's naval rivals to attack trade on a near global scale.
Despite being of less strategic importance than other oceanic spaces, control of the sea lanes of the South Atlantic was key to protecting the trade of the informal empire, as well as for relations with the South American countries themselves. In this respect, many of the most significant ties were intrinsically linked to the Royal Navy, which had a long and important connection with many of their navies. 90 The South
Atlantic was also part of key routes to places beyond its boundaries. Indeed, until the Panama Canal was opened (in 1914), it was immensely important for controlling the Pacific and, in turn, for keeping in check the naval ambitions of the USA and France, especially once ships' ranges increased. Since the Royal Navy remained predominantly coal powered into the First World War, to control the South Atlantic, and indeed just to pass through it, the navy needed to have a secure and reliable source of quality coal. 91 The establishment of naval coaling stations at strategic points around the world was therefore vital to the protection of British trading routes by the Royal Navy, although sole reliance on such stations presented it with serious difficulties. 92 The costs of establishing a station, and of maintaining coal stocks were not inconsiderable, though these could vary with their size and significance. However, due in part to the changing nature of the navy's ships and the ever-changing geopolitical situation, the relevance of specific naval coaling stations could, and did, differ, both at specific in the early twentieth century. 93 It is important to note that there were huge distances between these stations, and even ships of the early twentieth century could not reach the Falklands, the only British station in the environs of South America, without coaling en route from Europe, as it was some 3,000 miles beyond their range. The nearest station in the other direction, Vancouver in the Pacific, was even further away.
In the middle decades of the nineteenth century, Royal Navy vessels obtained coal from various Admiralty stores in South America, including Rio de Janeiro, Pernambuco, Bahia, Valparaiso and Callao, although ships' captains and commanders often needed to make casual purchases from commercial agents where no naval stores existed. 94 The amounts shipped out to these naval stores were small, that to Rio de Janeiro, the most widely used, averaging just 1,665 tons per annum for the four-year period 1856-59. 95 By 1869, in addition to locations already mentioned, HM ships were taking on board coal at Montevideo and the Falklands, though the amount at the latter for the first half of 1869 was just 169 tons. 96 The largest amount taken on board from South American stores by a single ship during the first half of 1869 was 571.5
tons by the HMS Oberon, in addition to the 257.35 tons it took on board at St.
Vincent, Tenerife and Madeira. 97 Even at this early date, all but a tiny fraction of the 3,368.1 tons of coal used by HM ships in the first half of 1869 was Welsh.
The nature of the stores at which coal was loaded is not entirely clear, being described in some returns as naval establishments or depots, with other returns indicating that the coal was loaded at the contractor's yard. In all likelihood, these were merely stocks held by commercial coaling stations for naval use. This is suggested again by the fact that navy estimates for 1870-71 fail to indicate the existence of any coal depots or dockyards in South America, although a return of coal stocks at "home and foreign stations" for 1869-71 mentions Valparaiso. 98 Subsequent returns of proposed expenditure at naval dockyards at home and abroad contained in the navy estimates for the 1870s, 1880s and 1890s fail to make any mention of a dockyard or coaling station in South America. It is in the navy estimates for 1900-01 that the Falklands is mentioned for the first time, despite the fact that the territory had been under the control of successive Naval Officers in Charge during the early period of British re-occupation from 1833. 99 In the early 1840s a dozen Royal marines were garrisoned on the Falklands when settlement was shifted to what became Port Stanley, with its natural harbour. 100 Discussions over whether the Falklands should become a major naval station never seem to have got far, although in the third quarter of the nineteenth century it did become an important centre for provisioning and repairing ships sailing round Cape Horn, including British naval vessels.
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Due to their remoteness and isolation from outside threats, the Falklands were never considered to be of much importance by the Admiralty during the era in which sail continued to dominate in the South Atlantic and it would appear that the naval facility there was allowed to diminish. In their third and final report, published on 22 Although visits by ships of the Royal Navy's South-east Coast of South America squadron to the Falklands became more frequent following the construction of the naval coaling depot in the early 1900s, they were still few in number and often shortlived. 108 During the middle of the decade, consular reports fail to mention any such visits, but in 1908 it was noted that HMS Sappho had "paid a short visit to the Colony by Welsh steam coal, the Royal Navy was able to access the highest quality of coal it required for its warships from the network of coaling stations established across the continent to satisfy commercial needs. 116 Thus, Britain's economic power in South America was especially important to the navy in the South Atlantic, as it allowed British warships to freely coal at the commercial stations located there, both in peace and war. Not only did this allow the Royal Navy the ability to function without founding major new naval stations, with all of the expense that that would have incurred, but also enabled Britain to put pressure on the ports at which these stations were located, especially in times of hostilities, to limit, or indeed cease, the supply of coal for foreign naval use. Such capabilities were central to the ability of Britain to retain commercial and political control of the South Atlantic and South American markets, reflecting the fundamental nature of Welsh coal to Britain's informal empire in this region. Moreover, since all Royal Navy ships could benefit from these arrangements, the existence of the informal empire effectively reduced the military costs of the formal.
Conclusions
In this paper we have argued that Welsh coal, and the network of coaling depots The port cities along the Atlantic seaboard where coaling stations were established were vital to the economic development of South America, as too were the railways which radiated therefrom and distributed the imported coal to the hinterland. Despite the undoubted importance of coal, the index of an important recent work on informal empire contains no entries for coal or steam, and only minor references to coal-related issues are to be found in the text. 117 Furthermore, in the volume of the Oxford History of the British Empire covering the nineteenth century, there are more references to coconuts and coffee than to coal, which has only three mentions. We therefore conclude that given its importance to Britain's trade with the continent, and in enabling the Royal Navy to protect this trade, Welsh coal needs to be re-integrated into, and given greater prominence within, studies of the informal empire. As the Welsh Marxist historian, Gwyn Alf Williams put it, by the 1870s, Wales "nested at the heart of an imperial economy," not least, due to the fact that "Welsh coal kept the Royal Navy afloat."
118
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank the two anonymous referees for their insightful comments on the initial submitted version of this paper which have materially helped to improve it.
We are also grateful to participants at the "Crossroads of Empire" workshop held at Empire.
